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MustRead Standard. When learned and implemented, these principals become powerful drivers of business excellence. Renowned strategy expert William A. Cohen, whose considerable experience in the military, corporate, and academic sectors forms the basis for The Art of the Strategist, presents the timeless lessons. Bush, and Arnold Schwarzenegger, and the business successes of internet giant VeriSign and other high-profile companies, The Art of the Strategist proves how superior strategy trumps other factors in almost every competitive arena.
The ten lessons in turn form a road-map to decisive victory in business. Translated into Korean and Russian. This book was recommended by:. Though his methods are questioned, Britain's Field Marshal Haig was ultimately proved correct in his grand strategic vision: "We cannot hope to win until we have defeated the German Army.
Interior lines thus became meaningless as Germany had nothing more to offer its allies. The props eventually fell, but only because they were themselves no longer supported. The role of the tank in World War I strategy is often poorly understood. Its supporters saw it as the weapon of victory, and many observers since have accused the high commands especially the British of shortsightedness in this matter, particularly in view of what tanks have achieved since. Nevertheless, the World War I tank's limitations, imposed by the limits of contemporary engineering technology, have to be borne in mind.
They were slow men could run, and frequently walk, faster ; vulnerable to artillery due to their size, clumsiness and inability to carry armour against anything but rifle and machine gun ammunition; extremely uncomfortable conditions inside them often incapacitating crews with engine fumes and heat, and driving some mad with noise ; and often despicably unreliable frequently failing to make it to their targets due to engine or track failures.
This was the factor behind the seemingly mindless retention of large bodies of cavalry, which even in , with armies incompletely mechanised, were still the only armed force capable of moving significantly faster than an infantryman on foot. It was not until the relevant technology in engineering and communications matured between the wars that the tank and the airplane could be forged into the co-ordinated force needed to truly restore manoeuvre to warfare.
In the years following World War I, two of the technologies that had been introduced during that conflict, the aircraft and the tank , became the subject of strategic study. The leading theorist of air power was Italian general Giulio Douhet , who believed that future wars would be won or lost in the air. The air force would carry the offensive, and the role of the ground forces would be defensive only. Douhet's doctrine of strategic bombing meant striking at the enemy's heartland—his cities, industry and communications.
Air power would thereby reduce his willingness and capacity to fight. At this time the idea of the aircraft carrier and its capabilities also started to change thinking in those countries with large fleets, but nowhere as much as in Japan. The UK and US seem to have seen the carrier as a defensive weapon, and their designs mirrored this; the Japanese Imperial Navy seem to have developed a new offensive strategy based on the power projection these made possible. British general J. Fuller , architect of the first great tank battle at Cambrai , and his contemporary, B.
Liddell Hart , were amongst the most prominent advocates of mechanization and motorization of the army in Britain.
In Germany, study groups were set up by Hans von Seeckt , commander of the Reichswehr Truppenamt, for 57 areas of strategy and tactics to learn from World War I and to adapt strategy to avoid the stalemate and then defeat they had suffered. All seem to have seen the strategic shock value of mobility and the new possibilities made possible by motorised forces.
Both saw that the armoured fighting vehicle demonstrated firepower, mobility and protection.freemuse.eywaapps.dk/wp-content/2019-12-05/8340.php
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The Germans seem to have seen more clearly the need to make all branches of the Army as mobile as possible to maximise the results of this strategy. It would negate the static defences of the trench and machine gun and restore the strategic principles of manoeuvre and offense. Nevertheless, it was the British Army which was the only [ citation needed ] one truly mechanised at the beginning of the Second World War, the Germans still relying on horse traction for a large portion of their artillery.
The innovative German Major later General Heinz Guderian developed the motorised part of this strategy as the head of one of the Truppenamt groups and may have incorporated Fuller's and Liddell Hart's ideas to amplify the groundbreaking Blitzkrieg effect that was seen used by Germany against Poland in and later against France in France, still committed to stationary World War I strategies, was completely surprised and summarily overwhelmed by Germany's mobile combined arms doctrine and Guderian's Panzer Corps.
Technological change had an enormous effect on strategy, but little effect on leadership. The use of telegraph and later radio, along with improved transport , enabled the rapid movement of large numbers of men.
One of Germany's key enablers in mobile warfare was the use of radios, where these were put into every tank. However, the number of men that one officer could effectively control had, if anything, declined. The increases in the size of the armies led to an increase in the number of officers. Although the officer ranks in the US Army did swell, in the German army the ratio of officers to total men remained steady.
Inter-war Germany had as its main strategic goals the re-establishment of Germany as a European great power  and the complete annulment of the Versailles treaty of After Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party took power in , Germany's political goals also included the accumulation of Lebensraum "Living space" for the Germanic "race" and the elimination of Communism as a political rival to Nazism.
The destruction of European Jewry, while not strictly a strategic objective, was a political goal of the Nazi regime linked to the vision of a German-dominated Europe, and especially to the Generalplan Ost for a depopulated east  which Germany could colonize. Until the mids, Germany's ability to realize these goals was limited by her weakened military and economic position. Hitler's strategy involved building up German military and economic strength through re-armament , while seeking to avoid an early war by diplomatic engagement with France, Britain and later the Soviet Union Stalin-Hitler Pact of August One by one, Hitler successfully repudiated the terms the Versailles treaty, using skilful diplomacy to avoid triggering war.
After starting open re-armament in , he carried out the re-occupation of the Rhineland in , and then the diplomatic annexation of Austria Anschluss and of Czechoslovakia in and Munich Agreement , September This risky political strategy proved initially successful, consolidating internal support for the Nazi regime and greatly strengthening Germany's strategic position. But the March annexation of rump Czechoslovakia , in violation of the Munich Agreement signed only months before, forced a change in Franco-British policy from an emphasis on avoiding war Appeasement to an emphasis on war preparation, of which an important feature was the declaration of Franco-British guarantees of Polish independence.
Hitler's strategy for war is usually thought [ by whom?
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He had wrongly assumed that Britain would be a German ally in the west against France, and so he did not foresee an enduring war in the west. Once the Second World War had begun with France and Britain as allies, German strategy aimed to win a short war in France and to force Britain to the negotiating table. After the conquest of France in May-June , Churchill 's refusal to surrender or to negotiate on terms favorable for Germany put the German gamble in jeopardy. Germany could not match Britain on the open sea and had not prepared its army for operations across the Channel.
Instead, the Wehrmacht hoped to strangle Britain's economy through success in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of Britain Through the summer and fall of , German strategy to win the war remained based on defeating the USSR. Confronted with the rise of Hitler's power on the continent in , and weakened economically by the Great Depression , Great Britain sought initially to avoid or delay war through diplomacy Appeasement , while at the same time re-arming Neville Chamberlain's European Policy.
Emphasis for re-armament was given to air forces with the view that these would be most useful in any future war with Germany. In August , in a final effort to contain Germany, Britain and France guaranteed Polish independence Anglo-Polish military alliance. Upon the outbreak of war in September , British rearmament was not yet complete, although the Royal Air Force had been greatly expanded and programmes for new aircraft and equipment such as radar defences were just coming to fruition.
Britain remained incapable of offensive operations except for strategic bombing, and this was relatively ineffective in the early war. After the fall of France in mid and Italian entry into the war on the Axis side, Britain and her commonwealth allies found themselves alone against most of Europe. British strategy was one of survival, defending the British isles directly in the Battle of Britain and indirectly by defeating Germany in the Battle of the Atlantic and the combined Axis powers in the North African Campaign. Prime Minister Churchill devoted much of his diplomatic efforts to this goal.
In August , at the Atlantic Conference he met US President Roosevelt in the first of many wartime meetings wherein allied war strategy was jointly decided. Britain was now also at war with imperial Japan, whose forces inflicted rapid defeats on British forces in Asia, capturing Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma.
Nevertheless, Churchill expressed the view that with the entry of the USA into the war, ultimate victory was assured for the Allies. In the December , at the Arcadia Conference , the Allied leaders agreed to the " Germany first " principle whereby Germany was to be defeated first, and then Japan. However, Allied land forces would not be capable of invading the mainland of Europe for years, even as Joseph Stalin pressed for the western allies to alleviate pressure on the Eastern front. Supporting the Soviet war effort was a significant element of Allied strategy, and significant aid was shipped to the USSR through the Lend-Lease programme.
Strategic warfare, and especially strategic bombing, was a supporting component of Allied strategy. Through and , the Allies gradually won the war at sea and in the air, blockading Germany and subjecting her to a strategic bombing campaign of increasing effectiveness Strategic bombing during World War II. In January , at the Casablanca Conference , the Allies agreed to demand Axis unconditional surrender, a war aim which implied the physical occupation of Germany with land forces. While building up strength for an invasion of continental Europe, the Allies pursued an indirect strategy by invading Europe from the South.
Churchill especially favoured a Southern strategy, aiming to attack the "soft underbelly" of Axis Europe through Italy, Greece and the Balkans in a strategy similar to the First World War idea of "knocking out the supports". Roosevelt favoured a more direct approach through northern Europe, and with the Invasion of Normandy in June , the weight of Allied effort shifted to the direct conquest of Germany. From , as German defeat became more and more inevitable, the shape of post-war Europe assumed greater importance in Allied strategy. At the Second Quebec Conference in September , the Allies agreed to partition and de-industrialize a defeated Germany so as to render her permanently unable to wage war Morgenthau Plan.
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After the war, this plan was abandoned as unworkable.